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Abstract
The recent plunge in oil prices has brought into question the generally accepted
view that lower oil prices are good for the US and the global economy. In this paper,
using a quarterly multi-country econometric model, we rst show that a fall in oil
prices tends relatively quickly to lower interest rates and ination in most countries,
and increase global real equity prices. The e¤ects on real output are positive, although
they take longer to materialize (around 4 quarters after the shock). We then re-
examine the e¤ects of low oil prices on the US economy over di¤erent sub-periods
using monthly observations on real oil prices, real equity prices and real dividends.
We conrm the perverse positive relationship between oil and equity prices over the
period since the 2008 nancial crisis highlighted in the recent literature, but show that
this relationship has been unstable when considered over the longer time period of
19462016. In contrast, we nd a stable negative relationship between oil prices and
real dividends which we argue is a better proxy for economic activity (as compared to
equity prices). On the supply side, the e¤ects of lower oil prices di¤er widely across
the di¤erent oil producers, and could be perverse initially, as some of the major oil
producers try to compensate their loss of revenues by raising production. Taking
demand and supply adjustments to oil price changes as a whole, we conclude that oil
markets equilibrate but rather slowly, with large episodic swings between low and high
oil prices.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Oil markets have experienced frequent episodes of boom and bust, ever since oil was produced
in large commercial quantities in Pennsylvania back in 1859. Real oil prices (WTI in 2015
US dollar) have uctuated between highs of $145 to lows of $15 per barrel over the period
1946M1 and 2016M6 (Figure 1). The control of oil markets by the major international oil
companies, the so called Seven Sisters, backed by the UK and US governments, meant low
and relatively steady oil prices until the late 1960s. However, a new era began with the
foundation of OPEC in 1960, the 1968 coup in Libya which led to new agreements initially
with the independent oil companies and then with the Seven Sisters across all major oil
producers in the Middle East and elsewhere, not to mention the start of a downward trend
in US oil production in 1971. As a result, oil markets entered a new phase as the Seven
Sisters lost control to markets and oil producers, oil prices quadrupled, ushering in an era of
high oil price volatility and frequent periods of boom and bust often triggered by military
and political events.
Figure 1: Nominal and Real (2015 US dollars) WTI Oil Prices
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Data sources: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA).
In fact, since 1986 there have been six episodes of sharp decline in oil prices (30% or
more in each episode), in a relatively short period of time (within seven months), and with
relatively large e¤ects on the global economy (see Figure 1 and Ba¤es et al. 2015). Therefore,
while the fall in oil prices since June 2014 is large, it is by no means unprecedented, and there
is an extensive literature on the economic consequences of oil shocks for the global economy
in terms of their impacts on real output and real equity prices, see for instance, Hamilton
(2009), Kilian (2009), Cashin et al. (2014), Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015), and Mohaddes
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and Raissi (2015) among others. Overall the literature suggests that the initial impacts of
oil price changes di¤er widely across di¤erent countries, with oil importers beneting from
the fall in oil prices (once demand conditions are controlled for) and oil exports losing from
the price fall.
The recent plunge in oil prices has, however, brought into question the generally accepted
view that lower oil prices are good for the US and the global economy. It has been argued
that near-zero interest rates in most industrialized economies, and the fact that the US
has started to export crude oil again, have altered the traditional channels through which
the benet of lower oil prices gets transmitted to the real economy (Obstfeld et al. 2016).
Moreover, it has been suggested that the positive correlation between oil prices and equity
markets in the past few years provides evidence of a slowdown in global economic activity,
as a softening of global aggregate demand has reduced rmsprots and demand for oil
(Bernanke 2016). Therefore, it is argued that the decline in oil prices this time around is not
good news for the US economy, and by implication for the rest of the industrialized global
economy.
But the net overall outcome for the global economy is far more complicated and depends
on domestic political economy considerations and the feedback e¤ects of oil price changes on
global energy demand, interest rates, nancial markets and world trade. Given that there
are many channels through which oil prices can a¤ect economic activity (both real and nan-
cial) in the US and elsewhere, one could for instance use the Global Vector Autoregressive
(GVAR) modelling approach to capture the complicated patterns of global economic interac-
tions; taking into account not only the direct exposure of countries to the shocks but also the
indirect e¤ects through secondary or tertiary channels. The GVAR is a multi-country frame-
work which links country-specic models in a coherent manner using time series and panel
data techniques and has been used in bank stress testing, the analysis of Chinas emergence
on the rest of world economy, international transmission of real and nancial shocks, and
forecasting (see, for instance, Chudik and Pesaran 2016). To this end, we use the GVAR-Oil
model developed in Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015), estimated using quarterly data between
1979Q2 and 2013Q1, and investigate the e¤ects that a negative short-term oil price fall has
on the US and the rest of the world economy.1 We nd that the fall in oil prices tends to
1It is worth noting that much of the literature on oil and the macroeconomy does not use a multi-country
framework, and instead uses a single-country VAR model, as representing the global economy. The majority
of such studies in fact consider the e¤ects of oil shocks exclusively on the United States, with the analysis
being done mainly in isolation from the rest of the world. See, for instance, Kilian (2009). Unfortunately,
these single-country models not only fail to take account of economic interlinkages and spillovers that exist
between di¤erent regions, but more importantly their single-country framework does not allow them to
consider heterogeneities across and within oil importers and exporters, which are arguably essential to
analyzing the global oil market.
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lower interest rates and ination in most countries, and increase global real equity prices,
with these e¤ects showing up relatively quickly, typically within two quarters. However, the
positive real output e¤ects, both at the global level and at the country levels, take longer to
materialize following an oil price fall, with the positive median impulse responses generally
manifesting themselves in the medium-term, around four quarters after a negative oil price
shock.
To evaluate the e¤ects of recent falls in oil prices, we need to investigate the output-oil
price relationship over a number of sub-periods, including the episode of oil boom and bust
since 2008. Unfortunately, however, quarterly macro series that exist are not su¢ ciently long
for a reliable analysis of output-oil price relationship over di¤erent sub-periods, particularly
the post-2008 crisis period. We cannot therefore make use of the GVAR-Oil model, but
instead we consider bivariate relationships between oil prices, equity prices and dividends
(as a proxy for real economic activity). Using monthly data from the US, we illustrate that
there is no stable relationship between real oil prices and equity returns over the last 71 years
and so the perverse response of equity markets to oil price changes should not be taken as
evidence that lower oil prices are no longer benecial for the US and the world economy. In
fact, using relatively long time series on dividends and oil prices we show that, as in previous
episodes of falling oil prices, lower oil prices improve prot opportunities and dividends in
the oil importing economies which is overall good for the world economy. This supports
the ndings from the GVAR-Oil model. However, due to uncertainties over Brexit, the US
elections, the threat of terrorism, and the surge in nancial market volatility (to mention but
a few), it is likely that there will be a delay in the materialization of any economic benets
of lower oil prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a multi-country
approach to examine the e¤ects of lower oil prices, namely the GVAR-Oil model, and in-
vestigates the global macroeconomic consequences of a fall in oil prices using quarterly data
between 1979Q2 and 2013Q1. Section 3 re-examines the e¤ects of low oil prices on the US
economy, particularly over the post-2008 period, using monthly regression analysis based on
data on oil prices and indicators of market (S&P 500) and real economic activity (proxied
by dividends on the S&P 500) over the 1946-2016 period. Section 4 argues that the response
of oil producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) to price changes this time around di¤ers markedly,
mainly due to the US oil supply revolution and, nally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
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2 Analyzing the oil market using a multi-country model
To analyze the international macroeconomic transmission of oil price shocks, we make use of
the global econometric model developed in Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015). Their approach
is particularly relevant as, in contrast to most of the literature, they model global oil mar-
kets separately from the country-specic vector autoregressive models conditional on foreign
variables (known as VARX* models), by specifying an oil price equation which takes account
of global demand conditions as well as oil supply conditions across some of the major oil
producing countries. They then integrate the oil market within a compact quarterly model
of the global economy comprising 27 countries (see Table 1), with the euro area being treated
as a single economy, using a dynamic multi-country framework rst advanced by Pesaran
et al. (2004), known as the Global VAR (or GVAR for short). This approach allows for
an analysis of the international macroeconomic transmission of the e¤ects of country-specic
shocks, taking into account not only the direct exposure of countries to the shocks but also
the indirect e¤ects through secondary and tertiary channels.
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR-Oil Model
Major Oil Producers Other Countries
Net Exporters Europe Asia Pacic Latin America
Canada Euro Area Australia Argentina
Indonesia Austria India Chile
Iran Belgium Japan Peru
Mexico Finland Korea
Norway France Malaysia
Saudi Arabia Germany New Zealand Rest of the World
Italy Philippines South Africa
Net Importers Netherlands Singapore Turkey
Brazil Spain Thailand
China Sweden
United Kingdom Switzerland
United States
The individual country-specic models are solved in a global setting where core macro-
economic variables of each economy (real GDP, ination, real exchange rate, short and
long-term interest rates, and oil production) are related to corresponding foreign variables,
(also known as "star" variables) constructed to match the international trade pattern of the
country under consideration. Star variables serve as proxies for common unobserved factors
and a¤ect the global economy in addition to the set of common observable variables (oil
prices and global equity prices). They estimate the 27 country-specic VARX* models over
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the period 1979Q2 to 2013Q1 separately and then combine these with the estimates from
the global oil market, which they refer to as the GVAR-Oil model.
There are many advantages to using a multi-country framework, like that of the GVAR-
Oil model. Firstly, the disaggregated nature of the GVAR-Oil model allows one to identify
country-specic shocks and answer counterfactual questions regarding the possible macroeco-
nomic e¤ects of oil supply disruptions in specic geographical areas on the global economy.
This is in contrast to most of the literature that focuses on the identication of global supply
shocks, rather than shocks to a specic country or region. Secondly, it allows one to deal
with inherent heterogeneities that exist across countries, not only at the geopolitical level
but also in terms of oil reserves and production capacities, to mention but a few.2 Thirdly,
this compact model of the world economy allows one to take into account the economic
interlinkages and spillovers that exist between di¤erent regions, thereby enabling a study
of the global economy in a coherent manner as opposed to undertaking country-by-country
analysis. In this paper we use this multi-country model to investigate the e¤ects of a fall in
oil prices on the global economy, both at the country and the aggregate level. But before
describing our results, we provide a short exposition of the GVAR-Oil model below.
2.1 The GVAR-Oil model
To simplify the exposition we consider the simple dynamic oil price equation (here we set all
lag orders to unity, but consider more general dynamics in the empirical application)
~pot = cp + 1~p
o
t 1 + 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t ; (1)
where
yt =
NX
i=1
wiyit; and qot =
NX
i=1
woi q
o
it; (2)
yit and qoit are the real income and quantity of oil output of country i at time t; respectively,
wi and woi are the weights attached to country i
0s real income and oil production in the
construction of the world GDP (yt) and oil supply (qot ), ~p
o
t is the weighted average of country-
specic log real oil prices, dened by
~pot =
NX
i=1
!i~p
o
it; (3)
2For instance, the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2016) reports that 14% of the total
proven oil reserves in the world is located in North America, while more than 47% is located in the Middle
East, with signicant heterogeneity of production costs between the two regions.
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~poit = ln (P
o
t Eit=Pit) = p
o
t + (eit   pit) ; (4)
P ot is the nominal price of oil in US dollar, Eit is country i
th exchange rate measured by
the units of country ith currency in one US dollar, and Pit is the general level of prices
in country i. uot represents the global oil demand shock to be distinguished from country-
specic oil supply shocks dened in the country-specic models (specied below). The above
decomposition of country-specic real oil prices into the US dollar price component and the
"real" exchange rate component (here dened by epit = eit pit) is important, since only the
US dollar oil price component, pot , can be regarded as weakly exogenous. The real exchange
rate component, epit, is determined endogenously with the other variables in the country-
specic models, such as interest rates and real output.
In order to integrate the oil price equation within a multi-country set-up we need to
write the oil price equation in terms of pot . To this end using (4) in (3) we rst note that
~pot = p
o
t + ept, where
3
ept =
NX
i=1
!iepit: (5)
Using this result the oil price equation can be written as
pot + ept = cp + 1
 
pot 1 + ept 1

+ 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t : (6)
In the GVAR set-up, the country-specic variables, epit; yit and qoit , are determined jointly
with the other macro variables. Specically, we consider the following country-specic models
(for i = 1; 2; :::; N)
xit = ai0 + ai1t+ixi;t 1 +i0xit +i1x

i;t 1 +i0p
o
t +i1p
o
t 1 + uit; (7)
where ai0; ai1;i;i0;i1;i0;and i1 are vectors/matrices of xed coe¢ cients that vary
across countries, xit is ki  1 vector of country-specic endogenous variables that include
epit; yit, and qoit (as applicable), and x

it is k

i  1 vector of country-specic weakly exogenous
(or starvariables). The starvariables, xit, are constructed using country-specic trade
shares, and dened by
xit =
NX
j=1
wijxjt; (8)
3In the literature, the real oil price is typically computed by deating the nominal oil price with the US
general price index. But as our analysis shows, for global analysis such a procedure is not valid unless the
law of one price holds universally, namely if EitPUS;t = Pit for all i. Only under such stringent conditions it
follows that ~pot = p
o
t +
PN
i=1 !i ln (Eit=Pit) = p
o
t +
PN
i=1 !i ln (1=PUS;t) = p
o
t   pUS;t.
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where wij; i; j = 1; 2; :::N; are bilateral trade weights, with wii = 0; and
PN
j=1wij = 1.
In our application each country-specic model has a maximum of six endogenous vari-
ables. Using the same terminology as in equation (7), the ki  1 vector of country-specic
endogenous variables is dened as xit =
 
qoit; yit; it; epit; r
S
it; r
L
it;
0
, where qoit is the log of
oil production at time t for country i, yit is the log of real Gross Domestic Product, it is the
rate of ination, epit is the log deated exchange rate, and rSit
 
rLit

is the short (long) term
interest rate, if country i is a major oil producer, otherwise xit =
 
yit; it; epit; r
S
it; r
L
it;
0
.4
The model for the US di¤ers from the rest in two respects: given the importance of US
nancial variables in the global economy, the log of world real equity prices, eqt, is included
in the US model as an endogenous variable, and as weakly exogenous in the other country
models (eqit = eqt), whilst US dollar exchange rates are included as endogenous variables
in all models except for the United States. The endogenous variables of the US model are
therefore given by xUS;t =
 
eqt; q
o
US;t; yUS;t; US;t; r
S
US;t; r
L
US;t
0
:
In the case of all countries, except for the US and the euro area, the foreign variables
included in the country-specic models, computed as in equation (8), are given by xit = 
eqit; y

it; 

it; ep

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
. The trade weights are computed as three-year averages over
20072009.5 We excluded the foreign ination variable, EA;t, from the euro model since,
based on some preliminary tests, we could not maintain that EA;t is weakly exogenous.
Also, given the pivotal role played by the US in global nancial markets, we excluded the
foreign interest rates, rSUS;t and r
L
US;t, from the US model. The exclusion of these variables
from the US model was also supported by preliminary test results showing that rSUS;t and
rLUS;t cannot be assumed to be weakly exogenous when included in the US model. A similar
result was found when the foreign ination variable, US;t, was included in the US model.
In short, the US model includes only two foreign variables, namely xUS;t = (y

US;t; ep

US;t)
0;
where epUS;t =
PN
j=1wUSA;j(ejt   pjt); wUSA;j is the share of US trade with country j, ejt is
the log of US dollar exchange rate with respect to the currency of country j, and pjt is the
log CPI price index of country j.
The country-specic VARX* models, (7), are combined with the oil price equation, (6),
and solved for all the endogenous variables collected in the vector, zt = (pot ;x
0
1t;x
0
2t; :::;x
0
Nt)
0 =
(pot ;x
0
t)
0. We refer to this combined model as the GVAR-Oil model, which allows for a two-
way linkage between the global economy and oil prices. Changes in the global economic
conditions and oil supplies a¤ect oil prices with a lag, with oil prices potentially inuencing
all country-specic variables. Similarly, changes in oil supplies, determined in country mod-
4Note that long-term interest rates are not available for all countries, and short-term and long-term
interest rates are not available in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia.
5A similar approach has also been followed in the case of Global VAR models estimated in the literature.
See, for example, Dees et al. (2007) and Cashin et al. (2015, 2016).
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els for the major oil producers, are a¤ected by oil prices and in turn a¤ect oil prices with a
lag as specied in the oil price equation, (6).
Although estimation is carried out on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is
solved for oil prices and all country variables simultaneously, taking account of the fact
that all variables are endogenous to the system as a whole. To solve for the endogenous
variables, zt, using (8) we rst note that xit = Wixt, where Wi is a k

i  (k + 1), matrix
of xed constants (which are either 0 or 1 or some pre-specied weights, wij), k =
PN
i=1 ki,
ki = dim(x

it). Stacking the country-specic models we now have
xt = 't +xt 1 +H0xt +H1xt 1 +0p
o
t +1p
o
t 1 + ut;
where
 =
0BBBB@
1 0    0
0 2    0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    N
1CCCCA ; H0 =
0BBBB@
10W1
20W2
...
N0WN
1CCCCA , H1 =
0BBBB@
11W1
21W2
...
N1WN
1CCCCA ,
't =
0BBBB@
a10 + a11t
a20 + a21t
...
aN0 + aN1t
1CCCCA , 0 =
0BBBB@
10
20
...
N0
1CCCCA , 1 =
0BBBB@
11
21
...
N1
1CCCCA , ut =
0BBBB@
u1t
u2t
...
uNt
1CCCCA ;
We also note that the oil price equation (6) can be written as
pot +w
0
epxt = cp + 1
 
pot 1 +w
0
epxt 1

+
 
1w
0
y + 1w
0
q

xt 1 + uot ;
where wep, wy and wq are k  1 vectors whose elements are either zero or are set equal
to the weights wi or w0i , assigned to epit, yit or q
o
it, as implied by (5) and (2), respectively.
Combining the above oil price equation with the country-specic models we obtain 
1 w0ep
 0 Ik  H0
! 
pot
xt
!
=
 
cp
't
!
+
 
1 1w
0
ep+1w
0
y + 1w
0
q
1 +H1
! 
pot 1
xt 1
!
+
 
uot
ut
!
;
(9)
which can be written more compactly as
G0zt = bt +G1zt 1 + vt:
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Under the assumption that Ik   H0 is invertible the GVAR-Oil model has the following
reduced form solution
zt = at + Fzt 1 + t; (10)
where at = G 10 bt and F = G
 1
0 G1; t = G
 1
0 vt:
2.2 E¤ects of a fall in oil prices
We use the GVAR-Oil model to examine the direct and indirect e¤ects of negative oil price
shocks on the world economy, on a country-by-country basis, and provide the time prole
of the e¤ects on real outputs across countries, interest rates, ination and real global equity
prices. As explained earlier, the modelling approach is based on that in Mohaddes and
Pesaran (2015), we therefore do not present the country-specic estimates and the associated
diagnostic tests here, but refer the reader to Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015).6
Figure 2 displays the plots of generalized impulse responses for the e¤ects of a negative
short-term oil price shock on global real equity prices, long-term interest rates, as well as real
output (based on PPP-GDP weighted responses of the 27 countries in our sample). It can
be seen that negative oil price changes tend to increase real equity prices and reduce interest
rates. The same pattern is also evident when considering the country-by-country impulse
responses. In particular Figure 3 illustrates the fall in long-term interest rates across the
major economies in the world following an oil price decline.7 We also nd strong disination
pressures in all major (net) oil importers, see Figure 4. These results are as expected, and
are in line with those reported in the literature. See, for instance, Dees et al. (2007).
While the responses of global equity prices, long-term interest rates and ination show up
relatively quickly and within a few quarters, the e¤ects of oil price changes on real output,
both at country levels and globally, take longer to manifest themselves. More specically, the
impulse responses for global GDP following an oil price fall is positive in the medium-term
(Figure 2), which is also the case for the individual country responses in Figure 5. Thus the
empirical evidence based on the GVAR-Oil model supports the view that an oil price fall is
good news for the US, the other major economies, as well as for the global economy.
6In particular, see Section 4.1 of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015) for the estimates of the oil price equation
and Section 4.2 for estimates of the country-specic VARX* models including discussions about lag order
selection, cointegrating relations, and persistence proles. Evidence for the weak exogeneity assumption of
the foreign variables and discussion of the issue of structural breaks in the context of the GVAR-Oil model is
given in Appendix B. Finally, for various data sources used to build the quarterly dataset, covering 1979Q2
to 2013Q1, and for the construction of the variables see Appendix A of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015).
7The results for the other countries in our sample, listed in Table 1, are not reported here, but are
available on request.
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Figure 2: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Global Real Equity Prices, Long-Term
Interest Rates, and Real GDP
Global Real Equity Prices Global Long-Term Interest Rates
Global Real GDP Oil Prices
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 3: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Long-Term Interest Rates in Various
Countries
United States Euro Area
United Kingdom Japan
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 4: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Ination in Various Countries
United States Euro Area
United Kingdom Japan
China
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 5: E¤ects of Lower Oil Prices on Real GDP in Various Countries
United States Euro Area
United Kingdom Japan
China
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in oil prices, with 95
percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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3 Analyzing oil price changes using monthly data
In what follows we shall mainly focus on the e¤ects of lower oil prices on the US economy
for three reasons. Firstly, the US economy has not been dependent on oil imports as much
as other industrialized economies, with oil production having rst peaked in 1971 (before
the shale oil revolution). In fact, the US started to export crude oil in January 2016 after
a 40-year ban. Secondly, thanks to advances in hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling,
oil production has signicantly expanded in the US over the past 10 years (see Figure 6). US
oil production has risen from 5 million barrels per day (b/d) in January 2008 to 9.2 million
b/d in January 2016, around 84% increase. Thirdly, the US oil and gas sector attracted
signicant investment over the past decade, including small rms issuing large amounts of
debt (estimated over $350 billion just between 2010 and 2014). As a result, the losses for US
investors in equity and bond markets have been substantial following the recent fall in oil
prices, with valuations of US energy companies falling dramatically and the number of gas
and oil companies in the US ling for bankruptcy soaring, which could have indirect e¤ects
on the US economy through secondary or tertiary channels. It is, therefore, important to
re-examine the e¤ects of low oil prices on the US economy, particularly over the post-2008
period. To this end we examine the relationship between oil prices and indicators of market
(S&P 500) and real economic activity (proxied by dividends on the S&P 500) using monthly
data from 1946 to 2016.
Figure 6: US Oil Production (1000 barrels/day)
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Data sources: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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3.1 Has the relationship between real oil and equity prices been
stable over time?
Figure 7 shows the monthly evolution of real oil prices, in 2015 US dollars per barrel, and
US real equity prices, as measured by the S&P 500 index, from which it is clear that taking
a relatively long historical perspective (1946-2016), there seems little evidence of a stable
relationship between oil prices and real equity prices. Moreover, Table 2 illustrates that
there are sub-periods where changes in real oil prices and real equity prices are unrelated, as
well as sub-periods over which they are negatively and positively correlated. However, over
the full sample the simple correlation coe¢ cient is not signicant.
Figure 7: Real Oil Prices and Real US Equity Prices (S&P 500), 1946M1-2016M3
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Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
To conduct a more robust statistical analysis we use rolling regressions of the rate of
change of real equity prices on the rate of change of real oil prices, estimated with 10-year
windows, and then plot the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices (blue solid) and
its two standard error bands (red dashed) in Figure 8. This gure shows that the coe¢ cients
were not statistically di¤erent from zero before 1990, became negative in 1991 and initially
falling (being statistically signicant from 1991 to 2001), and then eventually rising and
becoming positive since the 2008 nancial crisis (being statistically signicant from 2012
onwards). It is then perhaps not surprising that there is no consensus in the literature on
the relationship between oil and equity prices (Jones and Kaul 1996 and Wei 2003).
As Table 2 and Figure 7 show, a signicantly positive relationship between oil and equity
prices has emerged since the global nancial crisis in 2008, which has been discussed exten-
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Table 2: Correlations between Changes in Real Oil Prices, Equity Prices and
Dividends
Period Real Oil and Real Oil Prices
Equity Prices and Dividends
Full Period
1946M22016M3 0.008 (0.035) -0.105 (0.034)
Sub-Periods
1960M11980M12 0.018 (0.063) -0.071 (0.063)
1981M12000M12 -0.139 (0.064) -0.163 (0.064)
2001M12016M3 0.199 (0.073) -0.252 (0.072)
Sub-Sub-Periods
2001M12007M12 -0.144 (0.109) -0.088 (0.110)
2008M12016M3 0.404 (0.093) -0.329 (0.096)
Notes: A bold correlation highlights signicance, with standard errors in parentheses.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Figure 8: Rolling Estimates of the E¤ects of Changes in Oil Prices on Equity
Prices
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Notes: Rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices and its two standard error
bands. Dependant variable is the rate of change of real US equity prices (S&P 500). The window size is 120
months.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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sively by the media as well as by prominent economists (see Bernankes blog at Brookings
on February 2016 and Obstfeld et al.s IMF blog on March 2016) over the last few months.
The question is why is this the case? There could be a number of reasons. Firstly, while
markets are generally e¢ cient and therefore equity prices reect the fundamentals, there
are also episodes when real equity prices do not reect the state of the economy. In such
periods any evidence of a perverse relationship between real equity and oil prices could be
due to the disconnect between equity markets and economic fundamentals and not neces-
sarily any breaks in the relationship between oil prices and the real economy. Secondly,
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) accumulated large assets during the most recent oil boom
(2002-2008) and they have come to play a major role in reserve management of oil revenues.
The prominent examples are Norways Government Pension Fund ($830), Abu Dhabi Invest-
ment Authority ($773), Saudi Arabias Fund (SAMA) ($685), Kuwait Investment Authority
($592), and Qatar Investment Authority ($256), with the number in brackets referring to
their market values in billions in June 2015. On average 65% of SWF assets are held in
public and private equities (61% Norway; 72% SAMA; 65% Kuwait; 68% Qatar; 62% Abu
Dhabigures based on 2014). During periods of rising oil prices, these funds are topped up
with equity purchases. However, when oil prices are falling most major oil exporters with-
draw money from the funds in order to maintain, for instance, their welfare expenditure.
The equity transactions of SWFs in turn induce an unintended positive correlation between
oil and equity prices. Whilst it is true that such e¤ects might not be that large, they could
trigger larger e¤ects due to known market over-reactions.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between real oil and stock
prices is not stable over time. As such, the recent perverse relationship between equity
returns and oil price changes should not be taken as evidence that lower oil prices are bad
for the real economy.
3.2 Are lower oil prices benecial for the US and the world econ-
omy?
Ideally we need to consider how oil prices and real activity are related (as opposed to equity
markets). However, quarterly GDP series that exist are not su¢ ciently long for a reliable
analysis of output-oil price relationship over di¤erent sub-periods, particularly the post-2008
crisis period. Also, unfortunately, there are no reliable monthly observations on aggregate
real activity. While a number of investigators have used monthly measures of US manu-
facturing output, this is not su¢ ciently representative of an economy such as that of the
US.
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Instead we use real dividends on S&P 500 as a proxy for economic activity. The rationale
is that if the demand for companies products does not rise and they do not experience
growth they cannot make prots, and if they do not have enough prots they could not pay
dividends. While it is true that some companies strategically pay dividends even if their
protability is low, this can only be sustained in the short run (say one or two years). In
the long run these companies need to be protable in order to be able to continue paying
out dividends. In other words, there has to be a relationship between real dividends and the
economic climate in the long run.
Figure 9 shows the relationship between real oil prices and real dividends on the S&P 500
over the last 71 years, from which we observe that generally lower (higher) oil prices have
been associated with higher (lower) dividends. Table 2 reports the simple correlation between
changes in real oil prices and dividends, clearly showing a negative relationship between them
over all sub-periods. More specically the relationships are statistically signicant for the
full sample (1946 to 2016), as well as the two sub-samples, 19812000 and 20112016, but
not for the sub-period 19601980. More importantly we nd that changes in real oil prices
are negatively related to changes in real dividends over the post-2008 crisis period, and this
relationship is also highly statistically signicant.
Figure 9: Real Oil Prices and Real Dividends (S&P 500), 1946M1-2016M3
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Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Using a relatively long monthly time series data on dividends and oil prices (19702016)
we estimate rolling regressions (with 10-year windows) of the rate of change of real dividends
on the rate of change of real oil prices, and plot the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real
oil prices (blue solid) and its two standard error bands (red dashed) in Figure 10. As can
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be seen the rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of real oil price changes on dividends have
been negative over the whole sample period, and statistically signicantly negative for most
of the period. Interestingly enough, the benecial e¤ects of lower oil prices on dividends
have become even much stronger over the more recent episodes, with the rolling estimates
becoming particularly large and statistically signicant post 2009.
Figure 10: Rolling Estimates of the E¤ects of Changes in Oil Prices on Real
Dividends
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Notes: Rolling estimates of the coe¢ cient of the rate of change of real oil prices and its two standard error
bands based. Dependant variable is the rate of change of real dividends (S&P 500). The window size is 120
months.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
The rolling estimates give a clear indication of the changing nature of the relationships
between oil prices, equity prices, and dividends, but do not allow for changing dynamics
between these variables. Therefore, to check the robustness of the results to the dynamics
of adjustments between oil price changes and the economy, we also estimated autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) models, one with the rate of change of real equity and oil prices
and another with the rate of change of real dividends and oil prices.8 Instead of rolling
windows we estimated the ARDL models on the full sample period (1970M1 to 2016M4)
and three sub-samples, namely 1970M11989M12, 1990M12007M12, and 2008M12016M4.
We selected the lag order of the ARDL regressions with equity prices using the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum lag order set to 12. The estimates of the long-
8In a series of papers, Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)
show that the traditional ARDL approach can be used for long-run analysis, and that the ARDL methodology
is valid regardless of whether the regressors are exogenous, or endogenous, and irrespective of whether the
underlying variables are I (0) or I (1).
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run coe¢ cient of real oil prices are reported in panel (a) of Table 3, from which we can see
that the coe¢ cients are negative and statistically signicant for the full sample and in two
sub-samples (19701989 and 19902007), but the coe¢ cient is positive and signicant based
on the 20082016 sub-sample. This provides further evidence for the unstable relationship
between these two variables, and matches the results in Section 3.1 and Figure 8. Turning
to the ARDL regressions with real dividends, we see that in all cases the coe¢ cient of the
oil price variable is negative, being statistically signicant in all sub-samples even in the
post-2008 period, see panel (b) of Table 3.9 These results are in line with those using simple
correlations in Table 2 and rolling estimates in Figure 10, and therefore suggest that lower
oil prices are good for the US economy, even if we only consider the period after the Great
Recession.
For completeness, we also considered di¤erent measures of monthly economic activity,
namely US industrial production and manufacturing indices, which are widely used in em-
pirical work with monthly data. As before we estimated ARDL models over the full sample
and the three sub-samples, now between the oil price variable and these two new measures
of economic activity. The results for the ARDL models with industrial production are re-
ported in panel (c) and for the ones with manufacturing production in panel (d) of Table
3. The coe¢ cient of the oil price variable is negative in all sample periods and for both
activity measures, but they are statistically signicant only for the full sample and the rst
sub-sample, 1970M11989M12, thus supporting the results in panel (b) of Table 3.
To summarize, unlike the relationship between equity and oil prices, we nd a stable
negative relationship between oil prices, dividends and monthly real activity measures such
as industrial production, which supports the results from the GVAR-Oil model (see Figure
5), and does not support the view that lower oil prices have not been good for the US
economy since the 2008 nancial crises.
Nevertheless, the fall in oil prices has hit the major oil exporters the hardest given
that almost all of them substantially expanded their welfare programs during the period
of unusually high oil prices that preceded the current price falls. For instance, post-2011,
the GCC countries increased their social spending by around $150 billion. Saudi Arabia
increased government employees pay and benets by $93 billion and similar increases in
welfare were put into e¤ect by other GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and
the UAE); see, for instance, Abdel Ghafar (2016) and Devarajan (2016). In Iran, despite the
sanctions and the threat of more sanctions, the Ahmadinejad government initiated monthly
9In the case of the ARDL models with real dividends, we initially selected the lag orders using the AIC,
however, given the smoothness of the real dividend series and given that AIC selected a large number of
lags, the estimates were not reliable. We therefore based the lag order selection on the Schwarz Bayesian
Criterion.
20
Table 3: Estimates of the Long-run Coe¢ cients of Real Oil Prices based on
Various ARDL Regressions and Sub-samples, 1970M12016M4
1970M12016M4 1970M11989M12 1990M12007M12 2008M12016M4
(a) ARDL Model with Real Equity Prices
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:159  0:176  0:185 0:202
(0:073) (0:100) (0:039) (0:118)
ARDL Order (6; 12) (2; 12) (1; 1) (4; 4)
(b) ARDL Model with Real Dividends
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:016  0:046  0:092  0:111
(0:017) (0:014) (0:043) (0:048)
ARDL Order (1; 3) (2; 1) (5; 0) (1; 0)
(c) ARDL Model with Industrial Production
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:053  0:084  0:019  0:098
(0:025) (0:029) (0:014) (0:075)
ARDL Order (12; 11) (2; 11) (3; 3) (12; 10)
(d) ARDL Model with Manufacturing Production
Oil Price Coe¢ cient  0:075  0:116  0:022  0:067
(0:027) (0:036) (0:017) (0:063)
ARDL Order (3,11) (2; 11) (3,3) (12,8)
Notes: Symbols ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The lag order of
the ARDL regressions with real equity prices, industrial and manufacturing production indices were selected
using the Akaike Information Criterion with a maximum lag order set to 12. For the ARDL models with
real dividends the lag order was selected using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; see also footnote 9.
Data sources: Robert Shillers online database, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), and United States
Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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cash payments to all households irrespective of their income or wealth, and raided the oil
stabilization fund (rather than enhancing it) to partly pay for the program; see Mohaddes
and Pesaran (2014). It is not surprising therefore that the fall in oil prices has forced oil
exporters to cut back on their welfare programs, withdraw from their oil funds, and attempt
to diversify their economies.
At the world level, however, we would expect the increase in spending by oil importers to
exceed the decline in expenditure by oil exporters (given their di¤erent marginal propensities
to consume/invest), and so eventually lower oil prices should also be benecial for the world
economy. This was also clearly illustrated within the GVAR-Oil framework in Section 2.2;
see, in particular, the responses of global and country level GDPs following a fall in oil prices
in Figures 2 and 5. This in turn implies that demand for energy is going to start to rise,
which will put upward pressure on oil prices in the medium term, and the equilibrating
process starts to take place.
4 How do global oil supplies respond to lower oil prices?
On the supply side, the response to price changes is likely to di¤er markedly across major
oil producers. Non-OPEC oil exporters, particularly US oil producers, tend to respond
reasonably quickly and positively (negatively) to oil price rises (falls). As noted earlier, US
production had been rising since 2008, but peaked around April 2015 (at 9.45 million b/d)
and since then, with continued low oil prices, has fallen to 8.80 million b/d in the rst week
of May 2016 (see Figure 6). This large fall in oil production is mainly due to the fact that
unconventional oil (which now forms around half of US oil output) tends to respond to oil
price changes very much like any other manufacturing process. In fact, since mid-2014 the
number of US oil and gas companies that have led for bankruptcy has now reached 59, and
is expected to rise further, soon overtaking the 68 bankruptcies that were led at the peak
of the dot-com bust in 2002-2003 (see Reuters on 4 May, 2016). Moreover, the European
Central Bank recently estimated that energy related investments in the United States have
fallen by 65% cumulatively since mid-2014, with the energy sector contribution to GDP
growth in the US being overall negative.
In contrast to the US, oil production from OPEC is likely to be less responsive to price
changes, with political factors playing a signicant role in the process. It has long been
argued, dating back to the rst oil crisis of 1973/74, that major oil exporters that heavily
depend on oil revenues, set their oil production to achieve a given level of oil revenues (the
so-called target revenue model, see Bénard (1980), Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani (1980), and
Teece (1982)), and as a result respond perversely to price changes. The result is a backward-
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bending supply curve where a sustained fall in oil prices can lead to increased oil production
from some OPEC member countries who own large reserves of low cost oil, a demanding
welfare program, and a fragile political system.
Figure 11: Monthly Oil Production for Iran, Iraq, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the
US (1000 barrels/day)
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Data sources: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Amongst the non-OPEC producers, Russia has continued to increase production behav-
ing very much as predicted by the target revenue model, see Figure 11. Canadas production
has become more volatile but continues to show a rising trend. Oil production in Norway
and Mexico has stabilized following a downward trend since early 2000. Overall, despite
falling oil prices, oil production has continued to rise world-wide, with OPEC and non-
OPEC contributing to the rise, almost equally in 2015. For now, only US production from
unconventional oil has been declining under pressure from lower oil prices. However, accord-
ing to the International Energy Association (IEA) global upstream oil and gas investment
has been falling by around 23% and 19% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, and BP reported
recently that oil and gas investments fell by $160 billion in 2015 and is expected to fall by
another $50 billion in 2016; this in turn will have implications for future supply.
There is an important analogy between the Ricardian theory of rent on agricultural land
and modelling of oil prices. Ricardo (1817) observed that rent rises as land of lower quality
are brought under cultivation in conditions of rising demand for agricultural products. In the
same way, prot from productive oil elds rise as costlier elds are brought into production.
With signicant heterogeneity of breakeven production costs across elds in di¤erent parts
of the world, as well as across di¤erent types of oil elds within a given region, it is not
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surprising that it is the production of the high cost unconventional oil that is rst to be
negatively a¤ected by lower oil prices. If over the next year or so current low oil prices
prevail, further production cut backs from such elds are to be expected, in particular for
the US oil production which is expected to gradually adjust downward.
5 Concluding remarks
As with all markets, lower oil prices will eventually lead to higher demand and lower sup-
plies. The benecial income e¤ects of lower oil prices will show up in higher oil demand
by oil importers including the US, while the loss of revenues by oil exporters will act in
the opposite direction, but the net e¤ect is likely to be positive. On the supply side, the
e¤ects of lower prices are mixed with the US production falling and OPEC production rising
(mainly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq). The rise in OPEC production initially appears to be
counterintuitive, but reects the fact that some of the major oil producers try to compen-
sate their loss of revenues by raising production. This means that oil markets equilibrate,
but very slowly. Oil prices are likely to uctuate within a wide range, the ceiling being the
marginal cost for US shale oil producers (around $60 per barrel). This episodic process gets
further accentuated by new reserve discoveries, technological advances in oil production and
alternative energy sources.
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